Journal on African Philosophy (2002) ISSN: 1533-1067 LANGUAGE, CULTURE, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

J. A. I. Bewaji

It is proverbial that what distinguishes human languages from their subhuman antecedents and animal contemporaries are their infinitely remarkable capacity for production and reproduction of endlessly new combinations. ¹ But there is another distinguishing feature that one may wish to note, which is nearly as fundamental; it is the stand-alone sentence. The signal systems of animals are limited to simple occasional sentences and such also are the human sentences on which a dog (and other animals that humans have domesticated) learns to act. Serving, as it does, as the medium of science and history, the standing sentence - indeed the ‘eternal’ sentence - must be accounted useful. It confers one conspicuous benefit straightaway, in the domain of its origin, as an aid to ostension itself. Universal categoricals and standing predications serve admirably in speeding up the ostensive learning of new terms. ²

Let me begin by making a few rather oversimplified general statements. These will help us appreciate the gravity of the problem on hand and, thus, facilitate the discussion that follows:

First, language is the medium in which all animals that have the facility communicate ideas, impressions, information, displeasure, warnings, etc. Consequently, language serves in the interactive process. Hence, there are various forms of language, the most obvious of which is verbal. Other forms are sign, symbol, graph, etc.

Secondly, all animals that have the facility of language are sentimentally attached to the language, such that any form of act, suggestion or indication that endangers the existence, worth or value of the language is regarded as a threat to corporate existence. The perennial linguistic skirmishes between the British and the French (linguistic cousins, one might say) concerning language hybridization and diffusion by contrast with purity may seem unimportant, especially bearing in mind the closeness of these two linguistic groups, but it is a most telling point that these two countries whose languages have dominated, subjugated and subverted the linguistic heritage and identity of many ethno-linguistic groups around the world could react so ferociously to preserve their linguistic identity. The problems of lingua franca in hetero-linguistic states, and, to a lesser extent in hetero-dialectal states, evidence clearly this danger—real or imagined—which loss of language, even dialect, (consider the furor about the need to preserve, develop and make acceptable Jamaican Patois for example!) is believed to imply. The much-deplored supposition by Nazi Germany’s intellectuals that German is the only language most suited to higher order thinking, philosophy, mathematics, science and technology shows this. ³

Thirdly, language (retroactively) identifies and distinguishes. It confers socio-cultural traits, creating mannerisms and imposing gestural constraints. It protects the traditions of those that have distinct languages from invasive tendencies, enhances the independence of linguistic groups and is a basis for developing national pride and identity in relevant situations.

Fourthly, language determines, according to some philosophers, especially those operating within a strictly conscriptive narrow Wittgensteinian tradition, the limit of one’s world. This needs a lot of clarification to be meaningful, useful and non-tendentious. I am just citing it here to draw attention to it, and also in order to be fair to this tradition of linguistic philosophy; not that I think there is any empirical or theoretical sense in which it can be meaningfully cashed out as true. We may ask, what would it mean to say that language determines the limit of one’s world? A number of things easily come to mind: a) that there are certain experiences one cannot have if one’s linguistic competence cannot provide signal or communicative representation, codification and identification of such ‘out-of-stock’ experiences. This appears ridiculous in a straightforward way! But we cannot take it without the second limb on which it stands, namely, b) that there are certain thoughts one cannot have if there are no linguistic ‘tools’ for their expression. Intuitively, these appear false, but they gained currency with Wittgensteinian thinkers and neo-positivist, analytic and neo-analytic philosophers. It (the Wittgensteinian tradition) ignores the fact that language is a device, a tool, a dynamic human activity, created for certain purposes and serviced by the community of thinkers, in order to protect it from ‘degeneracy’ or ‘corruption’ or total ‘extinction’. It is made for humans and not the other way around, hence creative users, on coming across novel phenomena, transcend the confines of language, as is, to represent such phenomena in neologic forms. This is evident in the way that science, broadly conceived as the episteme (and in some sense, the metaphysic) of nature, proceeds in such instances.

This is not to forget the important ways in which linguistic rules determine what can be said. This deals with syntactic and grammatical rules. These are conventions to direct what constitutes a proper use of a language. And we should not waste unnecessary time on such a simple aspect at the expense of the greater point faulted above. The possibility of generating new linguistic categories and applications would have been impossible if language constricts in the way intended by the protagonist of the view under consideration.

Makinde’s (1988) discussion of “culture”, in African Philosophy, Culture and Traditional Medicine, makes very interesting reading in this regard. After noting the various ways in which culture may be defined, the author settles for a broad based definition, which regards culture as societal. He then noted that every philosopher is a product of a culture or society. This, according to the author, seems to warrant the conclusion that,

If a philosopher in one culture sets a higher standard of philosophizing than some others in other cultures, it is because one culture sets a higher standard of education, knowledge, moral and social values than some other culture, the practical ends of which would be the training of peoples to be good members of the society. ⁴

The above can become a dogmatic encumbrance on clearness if we fail to make some comments here. It is not particularly clear the sense in which every philosopher is a product of his/her culture. What we can be clear about is the way in which education, nurture and exposure, within a certain environment, determines the totality of the outlook of persons. Thus, it will be fair to say that the contractarian philosophers, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Rawls, and others are products of their societies. But it will also be correct to say that Marx, Nietzsche, Sartre and others are products of their societies, just as Quine, Donaldson, Davidson, Makinde, Oruka, Sodipo and others are products of their societies. What this would clearly be saying is that each thinker is both a representative of a culture and equally responsible for his/her thoughts. When representative, they expound their ideas in ways that explicate the culture or justify its fundamental ideals, but when responsible (in the sense of these thoughts being reflective of the self) they critique, disagree with and even attempt to dislodge, dislocate, supplant and even subvert these so-called ideals, because, for them they are regarded as fundamentally flawed. These last categories of challengers of the orthodox and established dogmas are regarded as revolutionaries. They help society to find novel and better ways of moving forward, even in their disagreement with the status quo. But then, let us attend specifically to what Makinde says above.

One’s initial reaction is to notice the awkwardness of the reasoning presented here, because, supposing that one or some members of a society\culture sets what is regarded as “higher standard”, how are we to understand that this is not simply their own eccentric conception of nature, society and what should be done or how it should be done? Could it not be a revolutionary introduction by such members of the society? What if there are conflicts of higher standards, how are we to resolve such conflicts? And in this particular context, which society or philosopher has the right to legislate that one method, system or standard of philosophizing is better (higher) than others? What yardstick do we use to measure this among possible alternatives such as,

a) being based on Cartesian rationalism?
b) being based on Humean empiricism?
c) being based on scientific, hypothetico-deductive method?
d) being based on intuitionism?
e) being based on metaphysical speculation?
f) coming from members of a superior (military) force? or
g) arising from the phenomenological tradition?

When we make a critical examination of the diversity of human beliefs in various parts of the world, it seems clear that even the simplest-looking belief system must be acknowledged to have developed from some form of critical examination of events, things, beliefs, etc. Without such philosophical presuppositions and, indeed, expostulations, on the part of members of these societies, it is difficult to see how such cultures and societies could have survived.

When Makinde speaks of higher standards being set, it easily comes to mind how the Hegelian system lent impetus to German racist nationalism. Could we conclude that Hegelianism developed because Hegel belonged to a higher society, consequently justifying Nazism, or can we take the opposite, equally noxious route, and say that Hegel’s “higher” system is higher and consequently led to the development of a “superior” racist culture or society? Whichever horn of the dilemma we prefer to ride, it is clear we will have to contend with very serious problems. But we must focus on the one that seems to appeal to Makinde most. That is the linguistic, positivist, analytic tradition. Can we say that the insistence of the positivists on the use of Hume’s Fork and Ockham’s Razor, revitalized in the form of positivist criteria (the mutating and unstable criteria) of verification and meaningfulness, developed because the members of the Vienna Circle belonged to superior cultures with higher standards of education, belief, knowledge, moral and social values than other European societies that surrounded them? May be the same would have to be said about the development of Pragmatism in America. From Makinde’s perspective, it must have developed as a logical consequence of the higher American culture and society!

While one can say that one society has a more advanced technological capacity, it is very unclear what it would mean to say that the same society has a “higher standard of education, belief, knowledge, moral and social values” (or, to take an omnibus terminology, “culture”), for “higher” here goes beyond a merely empirical level and needs serious epistemological, metaphysical and axiological justification. It is imaginable that we may have a very simple society and culture with these “higher” coefficients, culturally friendly, humane, environmentally friendly, but without all the accoutrements of technologies which Makinde seems to have used here. And if we add to the above a society where there is also a scientifically and technologically advanced, functionally educated and materially well-to-do citizenry, then we have a totally different scenario to analyze. That being the case, we would be forced to have a differential scale of “higher” higher standard! What Makinde seems to be after is a celebration of the indisputable technological advancements and achievements of many Western societies. But it is not only Western societies that have achieved this and even it is arguable that the Western societies have not achieved this in a vacuum (without piggy-backing on the resources and intellect of other societies). Or may be Japan, China, India and the countries of the Pacific Rim have become Western in virtue of their participation in the delectable technological dinner that attracts Makinde.

While it can be argued that all societies have developed philosophies and articulated educational, moral and cultural values, and while all these could be supported by evidence from various sources, Makinde, on the other hand, seems to think that in the past, Africa and Africans lacked a distinctly philosophical frame of mind and that with time (in future, that is) a distinctly homogenous African philosophical frame of mind may emerge. This latter expectation of the development of a homogeneous African philosophical frame of mind, if it means Africans accepting a uniform philosophical -ism, is an unrealistic and unrealizable pipe-dream. It is improbable that African philosophers, when they emerge in the “future” as Makinde posits, will hold a uniform philosophical idea. The fact that those who participate in philosophical discourse now do not is a clear indication of what to expect. Or, may be these thinkers are not really philosophers? And it is even more curious when Makinde thinks that the multiplicity of languages is a disadvantage in this respect - that is, of the development of a distinctly homogeneous African philosophical frame of mind. He says,

the philosophical frame of mind that is distinctly African in any important sense is yet to be established. One of our difficulties is in respect of language. And since language and cultures are closely related, beliefs and ideas in a particular culture must be reflected by its own language system. ⁵

What does it mean to say Africans have not yet established a “philosophical frame of mind that is distinctly African”? Two possibilities are readily available as interpretations here: a) either Africans have had no philosophical frame of mind to-date, or, b) Africans have had a philosophical frame of mind as evident in their philosophical deliberations, but these have been no different from philosophical frames of mind of other geographical regions of the world, leading to deliberations indistinguishable or no different from those found in other parts of the world. If the first is intended, it is patently false, as Makinde is quick to produce evidence of philosophical reflectiveness of the Yoruba Ifa Literary Corpus and their (Yoruba) traditional medical practice. ⁶ Other scholars have shown the interdependence of philosophical traditions in various parts of the world; that they have exhibited apparently novel ideas can be and have been traced to those of their immediate and distant neighbors. ⁷ If the second is intended, then we are back to the paradox generated by the demand that in order for philosophy to be (authentically) African, it must be peculiar, distinct and intrinsically African. ⁸ We are told that since Africans have not said anything no one has ever said before, then, they have said nothing. But this error has been shown for what it is worth, because human experiences are similar it necessarily follows that human reflections cannot but be similar: variations are determined by historical, geographical and environmental factors.

My inclination is that even though language and culture are interrelated it is not as if language breeds culture and culture is a passive recipient. The Yoruba say of those who live by the day that “they spend like an elédà” (elédà means a counterfeiter of currency) or omo a jòní gbóla gbé tó nfi owó méwèèwá jeun which translates to “one who eats with all the ten fingers, saving nothing, as if tomorrow does not exist or will never come”. Sometimes whole ethnic groups within Nigeria are adjudged to fall into the latter category. In such situations, one is hard pressed to answer the question: what has language got to do with the diversity of orientation that is intended above with regard to resource management? That is, what language has got to do with this assumed cultural difference among peoples occupying geographically contiguous territories is unclear, for it does not seem clearly true that it is language that shapes a people’s thoughts or predisposes them to a particular mode of thought or behaviour. If this had been right, then the colonized peoples would have become images of the cultures of their colonizers and such regions as the Caribbean would now be culturally indistinguishable from those of their founding linguistic metropoles. Even though language is the means of expression of experiences, thoughts and ideas, beliefs, opinions, fears and hopes, etc. it is very difficult to say that if you cannot speak any language at all (like children immediately after birth) you are not likely to have any experiences, thoughts, and ideas, though one may not have beliefs and opinions if these latter are prepositional and linguistically dependent. It may be contended that what is intended is the capability to have language not necessarily the de facto situation of having a language. This would be an unavailing ploy though. For, it would be like having a soccer match with an opponent whose goal post is constantly shifting as you advance into the opponent’s half of the field.

Now, Makinde quotes the popular Wittgensteinian dictum that “the limit of our language is the limit of our world”. ⁹ This is only one of the philosophical idols that have pervaded the philosophical pantheon. ¹⁰ There is little evidence that language is such a limiting factor in comprehending the universe - and incidentally, the universe (multiverse), is by far bigger than my, your, or our world. This is evident in the way we can coin new names—what we call neologisms—to approximate, appropriate and represent new phenomena where they are confronted. Such attempts show the flexibility and adaptability of language and its ability to grow through expansion - vertically, laterally and even incrementally.

Imagine the popular statement that “there is nothing new under the heavens”. What could be more circumscribing than a dictum that preempts, proscribes and annihilates all possible discoveries of new phenomena and new ways of interpreting old ones. Obviously such a statement is negative and anti-scientific and must have originated with a generation of humans who were very timid and without a drive to greater imagination and investigation, for humans are forbidden, consciously of unconsciously, from pursuing the investigative and curiosity instincts naturally inherent in them. What is undeniable is the fact that in every geo-cultural system, the situation of the environment goes a long way in determining culture. But since culture, broadly conceived, is not static, it follows that the language that constitutes the vehicle for its expression must be dynamic, malleable and mutable. If it were not, then language becomes a straitjacket, a master, rather than a tool. There is no gainsaying the way language carries with it culture, often becoming a serious coefficient; but this is only so because, apart from mere floundering gesticulations, language is the major vehicle for making sense out of diverse experiences. And since language varies, it follows that comprehension and representation of diverse phenomena must vary.

It must be indicated that Makinde’s view of language is rather strange. But there is no doubt that he is entitled to his opinion, which incidentally is shaped by his training in linguistic, analytic philosophical tradition (even if this may seem an ad hominem, yet it is the only palpable explanation of his wedlock to positivistic tendencies exhibited in the view under consideration). But then as a student of philosophy of science that he is, one expects him to be a little bit more venturesome and adventurous. For there is no idea which members of society can experience which cannot be expressed, even through onomatopoeic media when old categories are not available! It is here that one is worried by the submissive way in which Makinde gives up on the possibility of serious science and philosophy being conducted in African languages. This is especially so when he, a) neither canvassed any empirical data to show the impossibility of such a necessary and on-going venture, b) nor does he provide a rational deductive argument to support his suggestion, a possible means of clearly showing the validity of his position, c) nor does he even engage in a Laplacian probabilistic calculus to show the probable validity of such a conclusion, and d) nor does he use historical evidence of any poverty of the representationality of African languages, to show that such a venture cannot be undertaken successfully as there is no precedent to follow.

On the contrary, one expects Makinde to have been aware of the experiment conducted by the Faculties of Education and Science, University of Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University), Ile-Ife, Nigeria, in the Seventies and early Eighties, showing that secondary school children learnt mathematics (in Yoruba language ‘matimátíìkì’ or generically ‘ìsirò’ encompassing all aspects of calculations, computations, deductions, etc. available in the broad understanding of mathematics as Algebra, Arithmetic, Geometry and Trigonometry) and science (sáyènsì – Biology, Chemistry and Physics) better in their native\mother languages than in English, which is the official\formal language of business and instruction in Nigeria. ¹¹ In other words, there is absolutely no justification whatever for the assertion that,

At present, none of the African languages is satisfactory enough to be adopted as a continental language, rich enough for analytic philosophy and science. Most of the advanced countries of the world have succeeded in spreading their ideas and cultures, especially by means of their philosophy, science and religion, to other parts of the world through their well-developed languages. ¹²

In a very serious sense, Makinde courts contradiction. While he concedes that the Yoruba have developed a complicated Ifa system with such complex scientific, metaphysical, economic, social, political, cultural, moral, medical, prognosticative, environmental and other dimensions in Yoruba language, he still finds such a language lacking in the richness and sophistication required for philosophy and science. ¹³

At another remove, one finds Makinde’s ideas regarding a national language difficult to understand, given his views concerning the underdevelopment of African languages. On what grounds would he recommend any language as a national lingua franca? What benefit is to be derived from such an exercise? Whose advantage would be served in such an imposition? We find no clear answers to any of these rudimentary questions in Makinde’s discourse.

When we move to a still higher plane, and consider the matter of continental language, we are even more confused. Contrary to Makinde, the reason one cannot have (recommend, impose or legislate) a continental language in Africa is not because of a poverty of grammar, syntax or semantics. What he provides is a simplistic explanation. In the first place, each ethno-cultural linguistic group differs culturally from others and has an identity, which is borne by language among other purveyors of such peculiarities. It easily becomes a political issue which other language among all languages in Africa to adopt and embrace, without feeling a serious sense of loss and dispossession regarding the indigenous language that is being consigned to the background. Secondly, what about issues of practicality: would it be possible to get enough human and material resources to teach whatever language Makinde may, in pan-African terms, recommend for adoption by all the peoples of Africa, if at the end of the day he finds any of the many poorly developed African languages suddenly well developed and rich enough for science, technology and philosophy?

In a sense, one is suspicious that what Makinde regards as linguistic development, advancement and richness is not simply adaptability, flexibility and simplicity inherent in the ability of a language and its users in coping with new ideas, facts and issues, but the ability of speakers or users of some languages to use unmitigated force to imperialistically coerce others to adopt, through conquest, subjugation and colonization, their own languages. In another sense, because of the absence of specificity in Makinde’s views, one does not know what Makinde is recommending regarding the issue of a continental African language. English is now an intercontinental language not because of any special superiority of the language but because of political, economic, military and technological imperialism. ¹⁴ The situation is such that cultural imperialism only follows on the heels of other forms of imperialism as an entrenching, strengthening and perpetuating instrument. Thus, if we agree with Makinde that learning a language brings one closer to the culture that the language codifies, it is also necessary to recognize that imposing a continental language (desirable as that may be in pan-African terms) may only be imposing a culture (alien) on other linguistic groups. Hence, Wole Soyinka’s “FESTAC 1977” suggestion of a continental language may be an ideal whose realizability is at best dubious. ¹⁵ The same questions arising for national language will surface again here: Which language? Where do we get the wherewithal to disseminate such a language? If Nigerians cannot agree on a lingua franca, how would a continental linguistic agreement arise? Would a mono-linguistic continent not be at a disadvantage in preserving strategic secrets in times of external aggression? Questions are endless and answers are difficult to provide to the satisfaction of all the interested parties.

One feature of language that Makinde seems not to have taken into serious consideration is the ability of language to borrow from other languages its speakers interact with. The so-called advanced European languages have exhibited this capacity for mutual assimilation. The relationship between English, Spanish, French, and Latin\Greek are good examples here. ¹⁶ This has not been dissimilar to the relationship between the various Nigerian languages, especially between the three major ones – Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba, languages. The words “wahala” or “fitina”, “kudi”, “eego”, “owo”, “aboki”, “ore”, “alafia” and “gejiya” are Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba words for “problem”, “money”, “friend”, “peace”, and “tired” respectively which have found their ways into each of the other languages. ¹⁷

It is not language that investigates or captures reality and nature. It is the users of language. It is people, spurred by motivation, and leadership and curiosity, that investigate. Language may even prove to be an encumbrance where no firm pointers are provided. If the situation had been different and language were so paramount, the West African king of the early modern period who journeyed to the Mexico, would not have done so, because it would have been difficult to conceptualize such new phenomena in new environment.

Another factual matter that needs to be laid to rest is the assertion that most of the advanced countries of the world have spread their ideas, cultures, science and religions to other parts of the world through their languages. ¹⁸ This is not the logical manner in which such a spread takes place; rather it is through the reverse order. Those of the advanced countries that spread their ideas, cultures, science and religions, first colonized, by force of arms or through the use of subterfuge, the colonies and, because there remains a need to communicate even with the colonials for life to continue, then they have had to use their languages. The fact that one of the most international religions of the world, Christianity, did not reach the West through the Hebrew language but through another (or other languages) is a direct refutation of Makinde’s thesis. If what measures advancement of cultures is language, then Egyptian, Latin, Hebrew, Greek, Arabic would have greater pre-eminence, and, to some extent, Yoruba, which is spoken intercontinentally in Nigeria, Republic of Benin, Togo, Cuba, Brazil, and Trinidad and Tobago. And there is no gainsaying the technological ascendancy of Japan over the last few decades. Hence one would have expected Japanese to supplant English, Spanish, German and French if technological, scientific, and economic advancement is what determines the spread of language. Also Japan is noted especially as not being predominantly Christian and no one ever accuses Japan and Japanese of barbarism in their adherence to high levels of superstitious supernaturalism; showing that science and supernaturalism are not mutually exclusive. ¹⁹ In fact, the hegemonism of Japan is mainly technological and economic, not linguistic, even within the pacific rim; thus disputing Makinde’s thesis of a link between imperialistic influence and linguistic conquest.

As a matter of fact, African languages have left imprints in various non-African societies, making Makinde’s conclusions very superficial. ²⁰ To be frank, it takes a lot of resourcefulness and research to understand the reason and diagnose the causes of the type of underdevelopment that is currently strangulating African societies - infecting inadvertently the African academy to warrant conclusions such as those exhibited in Makinde’s thoughts. It has manifested itself in an absence of mental confidence and pride in such rudiments of development as language, a bulwark of self-consciousness, self-esteem and self-expression.

Makinde also seems to see a relationship between linguistic affinity and cultural affinity, thus suggesting, when speaking of European languages “a somewhat similar perception of reality among the users of these languages”. ²¹ But this is not borne out by the facts, for Makinde acknowledges the remarkable difference in the philosophical temperament of Western Europeans (assuming that we can even speak of such a homogeneous temperament at all of Western Europeans in the wake of the debilitating wars in Bosnia and other tribal squabbles in other parts of Western Europe) as shown in British empiricism and language analysis (as if this is not simply glorifying the most dominant group to the status of being the only group and as if there were not the thinkers of the McTaggart type even during the flourit of positivism) and of the Eastern Europeans as shown in the idealism, intuitionism and orientalism of Germany and other Eastern European cultures (as if there were no German and East European and Oriental empiricists). In all the instances citable, the danger is to exaggerate the commonalities and present them as so pervasive as to mean the existence of nothing else. Even where there seems to exist so much mutual linguistic assimilation as in English and French, we still run the danger of presenting a facade for a fact, for there is little symmetry between French and English philosophy. ²²

Let us consider for a moment what Makinde says about logical grammar. He is of the opinion that logical grammar is underdeveloped in the indigenous languages of Africa, and consequently incapable of handling the many demands placed naturally on language in the contemporary society. But, clearly one finds that his treatment of the whole issue of logical grammar is misplaced, because logical grammar may be formulated or latent. Those languages where the conventions governing logical grammar have not been formally documented to become a discipline for special study and debate have no less a useful logical grammar than those languages, which have, for reasons of necessity, developed the same. One disadvantage which the languages of colonized peoples suffer is the absence of a compulsion to continue to develop the languages to cope with novel phenomena: if English is the official mode of education and business transaction in Nigeria, what need would there be to present all educational materials in Ibo, Hausa, Yoruba or any other indigenous language? ²³ Also, it would be restrictive of international audience and profit margin for writers and publishers to produce materials in languages spoken by less than a million persons. The disadvantage is further emphasized by studies and researches being conducted in English, French, German, Spanish, Portuguese languages and literatures rather than in the indigenous languages and literatures, especially given the hetero-linguistic nature of Nigeria and the necessity to make ideas accessible across ethnic and linguistic boundaries for dialogical and pecuniary benefits.

It is surprising to see Makinde make such an empirically unsupported claim as that “For many Africans it is easier to learn English or French than a second African language, because the former are well developed.” ²⁴ This is grossly inaccurate. In the first instance, most second language speakers of English go through the process of the learning of English language, for example, throughout life (and one may say that native speakers are not particularly different in this regard). Secondly, it is clear that children learn any new language as equally competently as natives when translocated into the new linguistic environment, on account of job-related transfers of parents. Thirdly, adults take a little bit longer to learn new languages of peoples they live with if, and only if, necessary and they are interested in learning such languages. When educational needs arise for the learning of foreign languages to prosecute studies, there is additional inducement and an enhancement of the purely informal teaching system by reinforced, specialized, teaching and instructional facilities. Are these available for a Pan-African language?

Over and over, Makinde makes the false contrast between what he calls scientific language, which is well developed, and non-scientific language, which is not well- (or, is under-) developed. In all these instances, no statistical evidence is adduced to support such a purely empirical conclusion, nor does he provide any clear-cut measuring standard by which his demarcation is undertaken to separate languages into these groups. We may even ask: What is a scientific language? At best, this will have to be understood as a technical, specialized, formal, symbolic or coded language. It is made up of symbols and notations that are comprehensible only to the members of the special group that developed, learnt to use or employ it. Scientific language is not, and cannot be, the one spoken by everyone: it cannot be a natural language. When we speak of grammar, syntax and well formed formula of natural languages, it is simply because there are certain rules of communication and representation which participants in a linguistic medium must obey in order to fit in and benefit from a linguistic practice; otherwise there will be a lapse of communication. Makinde says, “although an African mathematician or physicist understands the work of his European and American counterpart, he does so only because he is able to read and understand such work, not in his native language, but in a foreign language, well-developed, scientific language.” ²⁵

This is a jejune argument. It lacks any serious foundation in fact. One may ask: Would the African mathematicians understand the works of their Russian, Chinese, Japanese or German counterparts without these works being translated into languages with which such African scholars are conversant? And are English and French the only “well-developed, scientific languages” in the world? Has it not been shown by scholars with the competence that Yoruba mathematics is by far more advanced, historically, than many of the so-called “well-developed, scientific languages” of English and French? ²⁶ And Makinde has good knowledge of the complicated nature of Yoruba science and mathematics, as enshrined in the Ifa literary corpus and traditional medicine, with its complicated symbolic computations and permutations. It is embarrassing that he could make the type of negative statements about African languages found in this work and later show examples of complicated logical induction and deduction in Yoruba reasoning, which are evidence of the descriptive and argumentative modes of language shared by all well-developed natural languages, to which the author seems to have sold his love. In this regard, it is very difficult to conjecture that any African linguist will accept the assertion by Makinde that, “Hence, the poverty of African languages has led to the poverty of scientific ideas and meaningful contributions to the development of philosophy, science and technology”. ²⁷

A number of remarks are in order here: a) Makinde seems to take contemporary African realities as a measure of Africa, especially the contribution of contemporary Africa and Africans to contemporary science, technology, cultures and religion. This disregards the fact that African societies once had centers of learning with world famous Universities and research centers. ²⁸ Even this summation is defective to the extent that it supposes that African scientists, for example, are of inferior mettle to their foreign counterparts. Makinde ought to be aware of the numerous innovative works of indigenous African scientists, majority of which have not been locally patented only for these to be commercialized by external and foreign agencies. ²⁹ b) Makinde seems to have a historically weak conception of Africa, disregarding the historical contributions of Africans to the sciences and to civilization including the challenged but uncontroverted African foundation of Greek thought. ³⁰ c) Now that Africans have been compelled to learn foreign languages as a consequence of colonization and slavery, can we, in the face of African, African-American and other African Diasporic contributions to universal knowledge, science and technology, still affirm the “poverty of scientific ideas and meaningful contributions to the development of philosophy, science and technology” by Africans? Makinde goes on to make further curious remarks to the effect that,

one of the greatest problems of Africans thinkers today is to find the words in their respective languages or dialects that would catch precisely the meaning and reference of foreign words such as the scientific terminologies: atoms, electrons, molecules, force and field, electromagnetism, thermodynamics and even, mathematics. ³¹

Commenting further, he uses mathematics, simply translated “isiro” in Yoruba, to show how inadequate the translation is. But this account is defective and deficient, because “isiro”, as we have earlier indicated above, can accommodate mathematics, with branches in monetary, spatial, volumetric, numerical, algorithmic, algebraic, trigonometric, computing, etc. aspects; all being isiro in the generic sense, similar to the way mathematics is regarded in English Language, with all kinds of branches and applied disciplines engendered from the root source. Leaving aside this open inaccuracy, one may address the substance of the passage. In the first place, it seems false to expect that languages that codified reality, represented apprehensions and comprehensions of reality and communicated these and interpretations thereof, both physical, material, ideational, theoretical, metaphysical and immaterial; leaving none unrepresented or under-represented, can now fail the people in representing ‘new’ phenomena, assuming that mathematics is actually new to African languages. For one thing, it can be easily and logically inferred that if Yoruba language has not devised equivalents to all scientific concepts dealt with in the tertiary curricula, it is because education at post-primary level has been in English, not because such alternatives are impossible to devise. Secondly, researches along these lines have not been popular because no necessity has warranted same. These considerations make the further conclusion by Makinde that,

if one enters into a debate on what is meant by African philosophy or African socialism, one must look at the words ‘philosophy’ and ‘socialism’ from the point of view of its meaning in English and what that could mean precisely in an African language, ³²

a very difficult one to accept. And when he speaks about the teaching of African philosophy and traditional medicine in English or French, we see the same error repeated. ³³ This is clearly because the teaching of African philosophy in African, Caribbean and other tertiary institutions and universities is not done in indigenous languages of Africa but in colonial and external languages; and it would have been odd to teach African philosophy in, say, Yoruba in a predominantly officially English-speaking university like University of Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University), Ile-Ife, Nigeria or for that matter at Ohio University, Athens, Ohio, USA, to a hetero-linguistic and hetero-ethnic student population with no prior knowledge of Yoruba language.

It is even further understandable why it is impractical if there are certain concepts that are not straightforwardly translatable from one indigenous language to other indigenous languages. What the author (Makinde, that is) here supposes is that in any language, concepts are capable of univocal translation and that meanings are transparently understandable. This assumption belies the fact that even within the same language, there are instances of disagreements on the meaning of concepts. “Philosophy” as a concept is no exception, as it is not unusual to expect that there would be variations in Makinde’s conception of philosophy and my conception of philosophy. This however does not mean that in Hindu, Japanese, Chinese, Cantonese or Yoruba, we cannot have a meaningful discussion on philosophical issues, or for that matter, engage in philosophy in our different languages. The situation is even more complicated with the concept of “socialism”, as there are as many versions as there are protagonists of socialist doctrines and critics. Interchangeability of concepts in cousin languages is not without limitations, for nuances, connotations, eccentric usage, etc., are not uncommon among native speakers of languages which outsiders may be unable to glean without some tedium. ³⁴

There is no doubt that Makinde is right in his conclusion that speaking a foreign language imposes a foreign cultural milieu on one, but this is not the totality of the explanation for the absence of confidence in the indigenous African cultures in post-colonial period found in the works of African academics for instance. The problems are multidimensional. The contribution of the heterogeneity of linguistic agglomerations that make up many African states is a serious one, but other equally severe ones are the successful assault that has been launched against the historical, political, religious, economic, scientific, medical, military, educational, ethical and cultural heritage of African peoples and the lack of defined vision, purpose, and understanding of statecraft by the so-called political leaders that came to power at the independence of the African multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic, multi-cultural states.

It is interesting to note the remarkable similarities between the position taken by Makinde and Robin Horton concerning the relationship between the languages of the colonized and those of the colonizers. Rationalizing the modus vivendi of his collection of essays in book form, Horton says,

First of all, in both my critical and constructive work, I had to take account of the basic realities of the comparative study of human thought-systems. Particular thought-systems of particular peoples had to be brought to the notice of the widest possible audience. And comparisons between such thought-systems required a standard, universally-current medium. Both of these considerations dictated that the thought-systems of the various peoples of the world be translated into terms of a ‘world’ language. And for the time being, ‘world’ language meant Western language. (Italics mine for emphasis.) ³⁵

The fact, which we need not contest here, is the presumption that “human thought-systems” expressed in one language can be translated into other languages. It would have been easier to understand if what was to be translated were the ideas as expressed or represented in another language. And, bringing ideas to as wide an audience as possible is not problematic once we have those ideas codified. But it would be a mockery of academic endeavor to go to a Christian church, observe the practices there and hope to make a translation of these into another language. If the liturgy and songs, observances, mores and catechism were codified, these could be translated, but it would still not mean that the intents, thoughts and genuflections of the believers would have appropriate linguistic representations.

But the above comments are incidental to the bigger issue that arises from the above quotation. This is the fact that some languages are ‘world’ languages. In comparative terms, it is not clear what yardstick is used to measure what constitutes ‘world’ language. But then, the fiat is already well conceived and executed. The ‘world’ languages are Western languages. And it is not all Western languages that are ‘world’ languages, only English and, probably, French pass the test. Spanish, German, Portuguese and others fail woefully, because they are not (if one could supply some criteria) well-developed, scientific or international enough (or is it imperialistic enough?). This is left in no doubt when Horton says,

Typically, the scholar doing this kind of work is concerned to convey an understanding of such thought-patterns to the world at large. He is therefore compelled to translate these patterns into terms of one or the other of the two or three languages that currently enjoy ‘world’ status. Now there is nothing in any way fixed about such ‘world’ status. In a few decades, political or demographic upheavals may confer it on languages quite other than those that currently enjoy it. For the moment, however, it is the Western languages of English and French that enjoy this status. Hence their use as translation instruments is unavoidable. In saying that translation is at the forefront of the intellectual processes involved in the monographic enterprise, moreover, I am talking about something more than a mere rough-and-ready search for dictionary equivalents. I am talking about a search for the appropriate Western conceptual pigeon-holes for African concepts and thought-patterns; about a search in the course of which Western concepts may themselves have to be stretched and bent in order to provide such pigeon-holes (My underlining emphasis). ³⁶

It is curious how this could have been the case, for one would have expected that non-linguistic phenomena couldn’t be translated into a language medium. It can be described or represented, but to expect that thought-patterns can be translated is a category mistake that one would expect Horton to understand well enough. However, the political considerations which might make for the transgression of one language by another warranted the need to find “pigeon-holes” in foreign languages of the metropoles for the representation of the unexpressed thoughts and feelings of others from the peripheries or colonial fringes of realities. The political dynamics of correctness of diction and acceptability makes the determination of instruments of translation immediate, not simply academic necessity. And for Horton, who is always very careful in the selection of words in the light of criticism, the use of “pigeon-holes” for the short-hand of “open-closed predicaments” shows that the priority is not, as such, the value of the “thought-patterns” or “systems” to those who hold them dear, but that of gaining world acceptance and expertise!

The similarity in the views of Horton and Makinde above cannot go unnoticed. Makinde may actually owe his views to Horton, though no such debt of gratitude is paid or can be paid given the fact that there is no intellectual love lost between the two academics. In fact, Makinde makes not secret of his disdain for Horton, as his monumental essay “Laying the ghost of Horton,” read in a Philosophy Departmental Seminar in the early nineteen-eighties would attest. What are common to both of them are the fact that they have a narrow definition of what constitutes “world”, “developed”, “scientific”, “mathematical”, and “medical” language.

Another instance of over-zealousness that may ruin the noble intentions of concerned African academics is the a-historical condemnation of the failure of African societies to evolve technological empires parallel to those of Europe at the end of the “dark” ages. ³⁷ This often results in lamentations of the late start of Africa in the areas of science, technology, mathematics and philosophy. For example, after considering the Maquetian six stages of civilization in Africa, (the bow, the glades, the granaries, the spear, the cities and the industries), ³⁸ and calling the last the contemporary period, as if there were no industries in Africa in ancient and pre-colonial times, Aboulaye Balde says,

But the strictly technical aspects of these civilizations are today mere evidence of black Africa’s lateness in conquering nature, a lateness that is expressed in all areas of human activities by the continued existence of drought, disease, illiteracy, urban and economic underdevelopment; a lateness that is also evident in social progress and in the confinement of knowledge to just a privileged few, with cleavages within the society in which there are elites as opposed to the castes, the initiated as opposed to the uninitiated. ³⁹

Obviously the conclusions drawn from the evidence do not follow. Though it is lamentable, it is not only in Africa that droughts occur, that there is disease, flood, wild fires, illiteracy, urban and rural economic underdevelopment or that there is the confinement of professional and technical knowledge to professional groups. It is strange that Balde has elected to be ignorant of contemporary California and Florida fires, the floods in the Mississippi planes, the devastation of Tornadoes on homes (strangely non-permanent ones) and other property that perennially takes place in United States of America, and of the notorious Australian fires and the flooding that plague the far Eastern countries yearly. It may however be that the absence of the ready availability of technical knowledge to be learnt by all-comers may have had a deleterious effect on the growth of science and technology in many African societies, but that is a different issue and it is not peculiar to African societies, as the great majority of peoples in all countries are equally ignorant (Consider the acquiescence of the ignorant majority in the United States of America to the conduct of the last Presidential election in the country for example, and especially the highly questionable practices of institutions of government in what one expects to be the greatest democracy in the world). It is obvious that the usage of colonial languages in the educational systems of African countries has further retarded the development of these countries. In this guise, Balde is correct in saying that,

We have tried to analyze these shortcomings and qualities in the concrete cultures of the black world. Theoretical reflection, just like examination of facts, have taught us that if black civilization and the use of language in Africa do not meet the technical needs of our times and therefore run the risk of disappearing, they, however, thrive on unquestionably great moral and spiritual values which demand that they are developed and judiciously adapted to modernity. This development and this adaptation will be carried out through the universal medium used for that purpose, which is teaching: teaching the values of black and Africa, civilization, teaching of African languages and teaching in African languages. ⁴⁰

His recommendation is justified, as he is aware of the fact that the propagation, development and continuous use of African languages “are the surest way of giving science and technology deep roots in their countries”. ⁴¹ But the road to the achievement of this laudable goal is cluttered with grave cynicism, potholes and pessimism of the type exhibited endogenously by Makinde and exogenously by Horton. Maybe one does not properly understand Makinde and Horton and others who argue in this fashion. Maybe what they are trying to say is that Heidegger, Hegel, Hobbes, Rousseau and others are correct in relegating the languages of non-Caucasians (especially, non-Germans) to the level of animal noises, grunts, child-like expressions of pain, whims, desires and caprices, with no intension or ostension. ⁴² Chinyere Ohiri is very perceptive in the conclusion drawn concerning the possibility of a language becoming closed. This is the danger that faces any language, for Latin is regarded in many quarters as a dead language, simply because it is the language of a culture losing imaginative users. Hence, no language is inherently closed and incapable of development if users are committed to its use and development, while the so-called developed languages of English and French can become closed, dead and extinct in a short time if there are no users and researchers finding new linguistic ways of representing novel phenomena. ⁴³

The objective of this essay will only have been partially achieved if no further empirical support is provided to show that those who wish to celebrate the poverty, or what Tangwa has ignorantly called the ‘destitution of African languages’, have been mistaken. ⁴⁴ This is necessary as a token call for serious, conscious understanding of the magnitude of the problem by those whose mental faculties are still open to objective review of evidence. The idea of a universal language or ideal language needs careful understanding, to unravel the motive, goal and methods of the pretenders to objectivity. Even as late as 1980, Tangwa quotes Foucault as airing this idea in the following words: “the oldest were the mother languages. The most archaic of all, since it was the tongue of the Eternal when He addressed Himself to men, was Hebrew, and Hebrew was thought to have given rise to Syria and Arabic; then came Greek, from which both Coptic and Egyptian were derived; Latin was the common ancestor of Italian, Spanish, and French; lastly, “Teutonic” had given rise to German, English, and Flemish.” ⁴⁵

It is obvious that this can only have originated from the depth of ignorance. One need not address ignorance here, as archeological evidence clearly points to the impossibility of the veracity of the ideas expressed therein. Even Biblical evidence clearly show that Hebrew language and culture is recent, and the historicity of the Genesis account deserves no better than can be accorded other culturally bound accounts of the beginning of the universe.

But, let us start by looking at mathematics and aeronautics in Africa. Evidence has been preserved at NASA to the effect that Egyptians had experimented with glider planes over 2000 years ago. Drs. Khalil Messiha, Guirguis Messiha, Gamal Mohktar and Michael Frenchman have documented this from several related pieces of evidence. ⁴⁶ And Beatrice Lumpkin’s discussion of “Africa in the mainstream of Mathematics history” is very detailed, regarding “the ancient Egyptian mathematics of the pyramids, obelisks, great temples, the African participation in classical mathematics of the Hellenistic period and the African participation in Muslim mathematics.” ⁴⁷ The author acknowledged other periods which were not covered, such as “mathematical games so widespread in Africa, the systems of measurement used in the African forest kingdoms, and the mathematics used in building the great stone complex of Zimbabwe”. ⁴⁸ She has painstakingly exhibited the depth of mathematical thought in ancient Africa, Egypt and the debt of gratitude due to these sources of mathematical and scientific development by humanity. It is obvious that the mathematicians of these periods used their languages and, where necessary, transcended the simplicity of natural language into notations and symbols, for example, consider the exactitude of the pi (p), even for the thought systems of those periods in human history.

On the other hand, Claudia Zaslavsky has shown clearly the relationship between the mathematical works of the Egyptians of the Nile valley in their Hieroglyphs and Hieratics and the mathematics of the Yoruba of the West African coast. In fact, the Yoruba system of numeration has been regarded as “One of the most peculiar number scales in existence”, which cannot be mastered by simpletons because of its conceptual and metaphysical complexities. ⁴⁹ The Yoruba not only have counting symbols but linguistic equivalents that were complicated to novices but simple to the trained professional.

In the area of human and animal biology, the competence of the Yoruba is not in doubt. As a child, for example, I remember knowing clearly all the physiology and anatomy of “bush meat”, that is, the animals that we trapped or hunted for food; from the various parts of the head to the toe, identifying what can be eaten and what is harmful and which part must not be allowed to get mixed with the edible parts, either because they are poisonous or because they make the food bitter.

This fact is further buttressed by the discussion of Frederick Newsome in “Black contributions to the early history of Western medicine” and Charles S. Finch’s “The African background of medical science”. ⁵⁰ Newsome was concerned to dispel the type of conservatism and pessimism exhibited by Makinde, Tangwa, Horton and others, by tracing the history of medicine, in the account of participants in the medical practice of that period. Finch has shown evidence of caesarean section, knowledge of plant and animal medicinal values, diagnosis of pregnancy, surgery and neuro-surgery in various African communities far removed from Egypt and the “Hamitic” peoples of the so-called Africa north of the Sahara.

The medical practices to which Makinde refers and the orthopedic practices which this writer has had knowledge of while teaching at Ogun State University, Ago-Iwoye, Nigeria, by “native doctors” are not matters that could be glossed over. ⁵¹ In the area of diagnosis, prognosis, therapy, etc., it is obvious that most African communities had specialists who practice medicine. They did so in the languages of their communities and in their own specialist symbols, which were known by professionals in the same trade and accessible to the initiated.

While many lament the secretiveness of the medical and other professional organizations of these times, it is clear that these were not in any case different from what happens in the various professions today! It is clear that language is definitely not an impediment to the development of the scientific spirit and the philosophical inclination by those interested. Other factors are as important: some are the vandalized consciousness of the colonized peoples which has created a fractured psyche and the ignorance of socio-political, economic, religious, intellectual, etc. leadership in various African societies today.

There is so much talk about environmentally friendly relationship between humans and nature, but we find that most metropoles of the world are concrete jungles. The so-called primitive societies did not build sky-scrapers in earthquake prone areas, nor did they rely on synthetic medicinal chemicals that were not bio-degradable, and consequently not physiologically friendly, for curative purposes. They lived in harmony with nature, if not with each other, because of greed! This was very clear in ancient architecture and technology of ancient civilizations. They practiced iron-smelting, bridge-building (e.g. one over a gorge at Kagoro in Kaje area of Southern Zaria in Nigeria) without the sophisticated materials available to modern persons.

Now, the Montessori system of education seems to suddenly have become the vogue in many countries. But did anyone ever ask the question how were African (Yoruba) children brought up in traditional societies? It is clear that this was an admixture of teachings and internships, in which each student was permitted to explore as much as possible, with the proviso that the adult reserves the right to prevent the student from harming self or other co-learners. This contrasts seriously with the suggestion by Will Durant that,

Education had few frills among primitive peoples; to them, as to the animals, education was chiefly the transmission of skills and the training of character; it was a wholesome relation of apprentice to master in the ways of life. This direct and practical tutelage encouraged a rapid growth in the primitive child. In the Omaha tribes the boy of ten had already learned nearly all the arts of his father, and was ready for life; among the Aleuts the boy of ten often set up his own establishment, and sometimes took a wife; in Nigeria children of six or eight would leave the parental house, build a hut, and provide for themselves by hunting and fishing. Usually this educational process came to an end with the beginning of sexual life; the precocious maturity was followed by an early stagnation. The boy under such conditions, was adult at twelve and old at twenty-five. ⁵²

While I have no access to the information that provided Durant with evidence for the conclusions regarding education and the age at which children could survive and become independent of their parents among the Omaha and the Aleuts, the Nigerian example fails to apply to the Yoruba of southern Nigeria. In fact the only reaction one could instinctively make without insulting the veracity of the information at the disposition of Durant is: “Wow!!” What a great people whose infants become adults at 10! The specialized trades among the Yoruba take very long periods of apprenticeship and post-apprenticeship supervision, cross-referencing and continued contact among practitioners of trades. ⁵³ Even farming needs careful study and patient attention for the farmer to succeed. Hardly could short periods of apprenticeship less than ten years, for the very bright child, starting at about the age of ten years old, suffice to instill the skills necessary for expertise. Consider for example the complexities of such trades as divination, priesthood, medicine, drumming, hunting, sculpture, dancing, poetry, etc. The ideal of fast-track maturity and pre-mature senility to which Durant alludes runs counter to the practice among the Yoruba that age and experience are not things you can acquire suddenly and the respect that the Yoruba accord both (age and experience).

In the foregoing, I have examined the arguments by some of the scholars who have held very derogatory and even pernicious opinions concerning African languages and their suitability for critical, scientific, technological, mathematical, educational, philosophical discourse. I have shown that such views lack serious empirical, logical or intuitive foundation. I have adduced historical, factual, logical, epistemic, metaphysical and scientific evidence to exhibit the unacceptability of such hasty, puerile and unwarranted conclusions about the nature of African languages. In the final analysis, the debate has been thrown open to language experts to seek out and develop, beyond the level of ignorance, to show that as a human tool, all living languages are dynamic enough to accommodate and express new phenomena. If African predecessors were not bemuted by confrontation with novel phenomena, one should not be cowed into submission in this century to unwarranted silence where-of one can express one’s perceptions, thoughts, feelings, ideas, etc.

While there could be strength in unity, this can only happen when the partners are cognizant and respectful of other participants in the partnership. While it may be desirable to have big countries and large populations in them, the experience in Europe, Palestine, Rwanda, etc. are definite warning signals to show not only the heterogeneity of so-called advanced and civilized Europe and the tension, disunity and inequities that lurk under the surface, but also the need to know that for the greater good agreed on by participants, mini-linguistic groups might agree to subsume their identity in the larger collectivity if all members are ready to respect and are sensitive to the peculiarities and sensibilities of other participants. Language unifies members of the in-group and may serve to protect their interests; resistance always arises when the advantages of language is denied without adequate compensation. ⁵⁴

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Copyright 2002 Africa Resource Center, Inc.

Citation Format

Bewaji, J. A. I. (2002). LANGUAGE, CULTURE, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY. Journal on African Philosophy: 1, 1.